The new European Border and Coast Guard: much ado about nothing?

Dear Followers,

I post below a commentary written for the Netherlands Institute for International Relations on 01/11/2016 discussing  whether the recently created European Border and Coast Guard is going to change anything.

Comments welcome!

The new European Border and Coast Guard: much ado about nothing?

source: European Commission
The velocity with which the Council and the European Parliament agreed on the extension of the Frontex mandate should be a sign of political willingness on the part of European leaders. The new entity became operational on 6 October, less than a year since it was tabled in December 2015 by the European Commission. The European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) agency can boast extended financial and human resources when compared to its predecessor, Frontex. These changes are, however, not commensurate with the task facing the EU in the coming years: that migration is going to be the new normal.

A European Border Guard Unit

What’s new under the sun? Drawing from an old dream of creating a European Border Guard Unit, which predates the creation of Frontex, this new entity can deploy 1,500 experts as a rapid reserve pool of border guards and technical equipment within three days. Frontex staff is almost double and should reach 1,000 permanent staff by 2020, and work more closely with the European Fisheries Control Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency in order to perform coastguard surveillance. It will also have a stronger mandate to work in third countries, notably through the organisation of joint operations on a third country’s territory and strengthening co-operation on return with third countries (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). Its budget should increase from 91.2M Euro in 2014 to 281.3M Euro in 2017, which is certainly remarkable.


The impact and efficiency of EBCG could nonetheless be lessened by a number of deficiencies. Member states remain the gatekeepers, as they retain executive enforcement powers for operational border management at the EU’s external borders, thus limiting the innovative potential of the new unit. This shared competence is, however, not matched by shared accountability, in particular when it comes to the incident reporting mechanism in the event of fundamental rights breaches during an operation. Criminal proceedings are, indeed, still regulated by EU member states’ legislation. This might be problematic where the judicial system of an EU member state does not offer an effective remedy to address human rights violations, as outlined by several European NGOs. In addition, a fundamental rights officer will be in charge of processing the complaint from a person who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to actions of the EBCG. Yet legal experts have cautioned about the lack of independence of such officers, who would be part of the EBCG staff. Another novelty is that in case of the failure of an EU member state to control migratory fluxes, a procedure is foreseen in the Council of the EU to plan to intervene in that country. If that country does not co-operate, then other EU member states will be able to re-establish their internal border controls, thus impacting upon the freedom of movement within Schengen. This measure specifically caters for the lack of capacity faced by the Greek authorities and other member states located on the Western Balkan route. Allowing other EU member states to close their borders would only block migrants in that country, sometimes at the expense of their rights and living conditions.

A drop in the ocean – please read of the rest of the article here

%d bloggers like this: